Background. Regulators must act to protect the public when evidence indicates safety problems with medical devices. This requires complex tradeoffs among risks and benefits, which conventional safety surveillance methods do not incorporate. Objective. To combine explicit regulator loss functions with statistical evidence on medical device safety signals to improve decision making. Methods. In the Hospital Cost and Utilization Project National Inpatient Sample, we select pediatric inpatient admissions and identify adverse medical device events (AMDEs). We fit hierarchical Bayesian models to the annual hospital-level AMDE rates, accounting for patient and hospital characteristics. These models produce expected AMDE rates (a safety target), against which we compare the observed rates in a test year to compute a safety signal. We specify a set of loss functions that quantify the costs and benefits of each action as a function of the safety signal. We integrate the loss functions over the posterior distribution of the safety signal to obtain the posterior (Bayes) risk; the preferred action has the smallest Bayes risk. Using simulation and an analysis of AMDE data, we compare our minimum-risk decisions to a conventional Z score approach for classifying safety signals. Results. The 2 rules produced different actions for nearly half of hospitals (45%). In the simulation, decisions that minimize Bayes risk outperform Z scorebased decisions, even when the loss functions or hierarchical models are misspecified. Limitations. Our method is sensitive to the choice of loss functions; eliciting quantitative inputs to the loss functions from regulators is challenging. Conclusions. A decision-theoretic approach to acting on safety signals is potentially promising but requires careful specification of loss functions in consultation with subject matter experts.
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The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The first section introduces the particulars of postmarket medical device safety surveillance, summarizes previous approaches, and distinguishes our problem and methods from these. In the second section, we describe our data, hierarchical models, decision framework, and simulation study. The third section gives the results of our applied data analysis and simulation study. Finally, in the last section, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of our method and suggest areas for future research.
BACKGROUND
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in addition to establishing safety and efficacy before treatments are marketed, also directs postmarket surveillance to monitor drugs and devices used in medical care. Postmarket surveillance is particularly important in devices because premarket evidence is often lacking. Many devices enter the market based on technological equivalence to previous devices rather than randomized trials; device trials, when conducted, are typically small. Postmarket device safety surveillance in children is of particular concern 3 because pivotal device studies rarely include children, 4 even though approved devices are often used to treat children. 5 Devices are frequently used in hospital-based care. A variety of statistical approaches are used to compare hospital performance in general and hospital-based device safety in particular. For example, hierarchical models identify hospitals in the ''extreme'' quantiles of the empirical distribution of hospital-level effects. 6 Sequential probability ratio testing (SPRT) computes a running test statistic for the cumulative evidence against a null hypothesis of ''performance as expected'' and signals a problem when the test statistic crosses a prespecified boundary. 7, 8 Other approaches are used in provider profiling, which quantifies the performance of health care providers on performance measures that may include safety. [9] [10] [11] [12] Our objectives and approach differ from those outlined above. First, we aim to discern which action yields the best balance of real-world harms and benefits. This contrasts with approaches that rely on statistical significance (e.g., classifying ''outlying'' hospitals) and do not formally trade off practical costs and benefits (although they may trade off statistical costs and benefits such as bias and precision). Second, we use past data on a hospital's safety performance to set a safety target, then take action based on comparing current safety performance to the target. This contrasts with SPRT, which continuously monitors accumulating evidence of a safety problem, rather than making a decision at a single time point based on a fixed set of historical performance data. Third, we identify only those hospitals with worse-than-expected performance that represents a departure from historical trends for that hospital. This is because our hospital safety monitoring perspective uses historical hospital performance to set hospital-specific benchmarks and detect actionable departures in a current year. Of course, other decision makers might want to rank hospitals on their whole performance record. For example, provider profiling seeks to characterize the relative performance of all hospitals, such as in pay-for-performance payment systems.
We apply a Bayesian decision theory framework to formalize the process of trading off real-world costs and benefits of actions that may be taken in response to safety problems. The theoretical underpinnings of such a risk-minimizing approach to make statistical decisions are well established. 13 However, this literature is largely confined to mathematical loss functions (e.g., squared error loss or absolute error loss) for the purpose of estimation and hypothesis testing, rather than real-world decision making. Rarely are these ideas applied to regulatory safety settings in which decision makers are asked to quantify the costs and benefits they consider in a safety decision. However, formal decision theory is applied in other areas, such as cost-effectiveness 14 and value-of-information 15 studies. Our article presents a novel combination of a theoretical framework for decision making with hierarchical modeling of data on safety performance to inform real-world safety decisions.
METHODS

Hospital Data
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in the United States sponsors an annual National Inpatient Sample (NIS) of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP). 16 The project collects a nationally representative 20% sample of hospital discharges. The discharge summaries include diagnoses and procedures, patient demographics, discharge status, length of stay, and severity and comorbidity measures. Participating states vary by year; in 2011, 46 states and 1049 hospitals contributed data on 8 million admissions. Hospital identifiers in the data permit linkage to hospital characteristics from the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey Database.
Our sample includes admissions of patients younger than 21 years in 2000 through 2011 (excluding births). The raw data contain 11,959 observations on 4123 hospitals. We limit to hospitals with 3 or more years of at least 100 admissions in the ''training years'' of 2000 to 2010. These data form our ''training data'': 4661 observations from 1200 hospitals. We also form a ''test data'' sample of the 251 hospitals that are included in the training data and also contribute data in 2011 (the ''test year'').
Using a list of International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) diagnosis codes 17,18 (see Appendix A; all appendixes are available online), we classify whether each admission involved an AMDE. Our outcome of interest, the AMDE rate, is defined in each hospital-year as the number of pediatric admissions in which any AMDE is observed divided by the total number of pediatric admissions.
We measure several hospital-level characteristics: hospital size (large, medium, or small) and binary indicators of private ownership, urban location, and teaching status. The remaining variables aggregate admission-level characteristics to the hospital-year level. Most measures use only the pediatric admissions in our sample: median length of stay, age, number of chronic conditions, 19 and percentage of pediatric discharges covered by government insurance (mostly Medicaid), admitted from the emergency department (ED), and ending with death in the hospital. Because states implemented different privacy rules and coding schemes, for observations with missing percentage of ED admissions (n5599, 13%) or median age (n5565, 12%), we use mean imputation. Finally, we compute the proportion of all admissions that were pediatric admissions in each hospital-year.
The funding agreement ensured the authors' independence in designing the study, interpreting the data, writing, and publishing the report.
Hierarchical Models
We fit a hierarchical model to the training data. Let y jt be the number of AMDE admissions at each hospital j51, . . . ,J and year t51, . . . ,T j and n jt be the total pediatric admissions. We begin by transforming the AMDE rate using a variance-stabilizing transformation that corrects for zero counts (by adding 0.5 and 1 to the numerator and denominator, respectively), followed by a normalizing transformation (taking the arcsin of the square root), 20 y Ã jt 5 arcsin ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi y jt 10:5 n jt 11
The addition of 0.5 to the numerator and 1 to the denominator eliminates the large spike of observations with zero AMDE counts. We use these particular correction values because they improve coverage of Wald-type intervals around proportions and provide good bias-variance tradeoff for small proportions. 21, 22 The transformed observations are very close to normal (see Appendix E, Figure 3 ), and we can approximate the error variance of the transformed observations using s 2 jt 51=(4n jt ). 20 This allows us to write a Gaussian hierarchical linear model for the transformed observations,
The global coefficients 5(b 1 , . . . ,b B ) 0 govern the effects of covariates x jt , including hospital characteristics and time-varying summaries of the patient population. The hospital-level coefficients b j 5(b 0j ,b 1j ) 0 capture idiosyncratic rates and time trends. We specify a bivariate Gaussian shrinkage distribution on these parameters with a 232 covariance matrix S and hierarchical centering on global intercept and year parameters (a 0 ,a 1 ) 0 . The model also produces a posterior predicted (transformed) AMDE rate for each hospital in the test year t, described below.
We fit these models using the rjags package 23,24 in R version 3.1.3 (see model code in Appendix C). We assess convergence using autocorrelation function plots, Brooks-Gelman-Rubin statistics, 25 and trace plots. The results reported here reflect 2000 adaptation iterations, 5000 burn-in iterations, and 5000 posterior iterations from each of 3 parallel chains.
We considered a variety of alternative model specifications, including a binomial model for the proportion of AMDE admissions and a Poisson model for the count of AMDE admissions (with an offset for total pediatric admissions). We examined different combinations of hospital-level intercepts and slopes and explored latent mixture models for the random effects. We compared models on the basis of convergence and fit statistics such as deviance information criterion (DIC). 26 Our preferred model specification (transformed data with a Gaussian likelihood and hospital-level random slopes and intercepts) had superior performance on all the measures we considered (results not shown).
Decision Framework
A complete decision-theoretic framework requires 1) a set of possible actions, 2) a parameter for the safety signal, and 3) loss functions for each action given the safety signal. We describe each of these in turn, followed by details of Bayes risk and the 2 decision rules we compare.
Possible actions
We define a space of actions a 2 A5f0, . . . ,4g that includes taking no action, a50; investigating the hospital by collecting more data, a51; auditing the hospital's safety procedures, a52; providing remediation (e.g., staff training), a53; or closing the hospital (shutdown), a54.
Safety signal
We compare the observed (transformed) AMDE rate y Ã jt in hospital j in test year t to the posterior predicted (transformed) AMDE rate from the model in equation (2)
where m jt 5x 0 jt b1b 0j 1b 1j year t . That is, we assume that the likelihood governing safety performance is the same in the training and test years. A safety signal can be defined as any measure of the discrepancy between the observed and predicted rates; for simplicity, we use a simple difference between the observation and the target, d jt 5y Ã jt Àỹ Ã jt : Note that because we have the posterior distribution of the predicted (transformed) AMDE rate, we obtain the posterior distribution of the safety signal, rather than a single value.
Loss functions
For safety signal d jt , a loss function '(ajd jt ) expresses the total cost of each action a for every possible value of the safety signal. Appendix B details a set of loss functions designed to represent the costs to regulators, hospitals, patients, and society of the actions described above. In general, the loss functions impose a cost of harming patients that increases with d jt .0. The actions that require regulator action have both fixed and variable costs to the regulator that represent the resources required to implement the actions. Some actions produce useful information (investigate, audit), which enters the loss function as a negative term (i.e., a benefit). Remediation reduces the AMDE rate, and shutdown substitutes the AMDE rate of an average hospital (i.e., one with average hospitallevel random intercept and slope; we call this the ''community rate'') for the rate of the hospital under consideration. The loss function for shutdown also includes a penalty for diverting patients that scales with hospital size. Figure 1 illustrates the loss functions for a small and large hospital; the units of the loss function are arbitrary, but we have formulated these in terms of dollars. Appendix B provides details of these functions.
Bayes risk
Bayesian decision theory establishes that the best decision minimizes the Bayes risk, 27 which is the loss function integrated over the posterior distribution of the safety signal f (djy Ã Àt ):
where a is the action and y Ã Àt is the training data. We have a collection of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) samples from the distribution of the safety signal, so we simply compute the value of the loss function for every sample and average over them to obtain the posterior risk. Further details are given in Appendix C.
Alternative decision rule
An alternative decision rule uses Z scores,
where m jt is the posterior predicted mean safety target from equation (3). Conventional Z score rules use statistical significance thresholds to decide whether an observed increase is actionable. Z scores are commonly used in studies of safety surveillance, although most of these studies make a simple classification of ''significant/not significant''. 11, [28] [29] [30] For example, only 5% of Z scores should lie above the 95th percentile of a standard normal distribution, so a rule for identifying poor-performing hospitals might identify those with Z jt .q :95 51:64. To extend beyond the binary case, we map the range of Z scores onto the action space by defining ranges. For example, Z\1: no action, 1<Z\1:5: investigate, 1:5<Z\2: audit, 2<Z\3: remediate, and 3<Z: shutdown. This approach is sensible only because we can order the actions in terms of increasing ''severity'' corresponding to increasing safety signals. Moreover, such a mapping does incorporate hospital features without further refinement (i.e., setting different thresholds for different hospital types). In our applied example and simulation study, we set these thresholds to produce the same marginal distribution of decisions as the loss function method. That is, if the minimum-risk decision is no action for x% of hospitals, we set the Z score threshold for no action at the x%ile of the Z score distribution to that the Z score action will also be no action for x% of hospitals. Note, however, that different hospitals may be given a no action decision under the 2 rules. This way, we compare the difference in the allocation of actions among hospitals, rather than the overall distribution of the actions.
Simulation Study
We also perform a simulation study to compare the minimum-risk and Z score approaches.
Appendix D contains full details of the simulation, which we summarize here. Each iteration of the simulation begins by taking a random sample of hospitals from the HCUP data. The simulated training data set begins with the observed covariates of each sampled hospital in each year in which they contributed information to the HCUP database (prior to 2011) x jt ,t 2 T j . Then we assign each hospital a random slope and intercept b 1j and b 0j ; these are the estimated slopes and intercepts from the model fit to the real data. We also assign a vector of covariates x jt in a test year t, as described in Appendix D. To generate the safety performance, we write a data-generating model that combines a set of true parameters b true with the hospital characteristics, slopes, and intercepts to set the ''true safety target'': m true jt 5b true jt 1b 0j 1b 1j year t . We take draws from a normal distribution centered at this truth as the simulated (transformed) safety performance y Ã jt ;N(m true jt ,1=4n jt ). The difference between the simulated safety performance and the true safety target in the test year is the ''true safety signal'' d true jt 5y Ã jt À m true jt . Next we estimate safety targets from the simulated safety performance, as we would do in real data analysis where the data-generating model is not known. We fit 2 different models to the simulated safety performance in the training years: 1) a full model that includes all the predictors in the data-generating model and 2) a reduced model that omits some predictors. This permits examination of the sensitivity of our approach to misspecification of the model for safety targets. The full and reduced models each produce a posterior expected safety target for each hospital in the test year and thus a posterior distribution for the safety signal, d full jt and d red jt , respectively. We assume that there exists a true loss function, ' true (ajd), that correctly summarizes the values of a hypothetical decision maker. In real data analysis, it is unlikely that we will be able to elicit this exact function from a decision maker because, for example, some of the decision features may not be measured or because the elicitation process is error prone. Thus, we also specify a misspecified loss function ' mis (ajd).
Given the 2 methods (minimum risk and Z score), 3 safety signals from different models (true data generating, estimated with the full model, and estimated with the reduced model), and 2 loss functions (true and misspecified), we obtain a set of 12 actions for each hospital in the test year, which we denote by a (method),(model),(loss) jt . The gold-standard action is the one that minimizes risk using the true loss function and the true safety signal, a risk,true,true jt .
For every action, we can compute the ''true risk,'' that is, the risk of the chosen action computed using the true loss function and the true safety signal, ' true (a (method),(model),(loss) jt jd true jt ). Note that because the true safety signal is known exactly, loss and risk are identical (i.e., there is no uncertainty over which to average). We then compare among actions using excess risk-the difference between the true risk of each action and the true risk of the gold standard action, that is, By definition, the excess risk measure is zero whenever an action is the same as the gold-standard action. In each iteration of the simulation, we average excess risk over all the sampled hospitals' actions in the simulated test year, separately for all 11 non-gold-standard actions.
RESULTS
HCUP Data Analysis
Our analytical sample includes mostly public (55%), urban (68%), large (50%), nonteaching hospitals (73%). Table 1 summarizes hospital-year characteristics in the training data. AMDE rates are generally low but vary across hospitals and year: 41% of hospital-years had no AMDE admissions, while the highest 5% of hospital-years had !205 AMDEs per 10,000 pediatric admissions.
Appendix E, Figure 1 shows the posterior medians and 2-sided 95% credible intervals for the global coefficients b. The predictors of higher AMDE rates include pediatric patients with more chronic conditions and more in-hospital mortality as well as being a teaching hospital and having a higher proportion of pediatric admissions among all admissions. Higher proportions of pediatric admissions from the emergency department, a greater proportion of pediatric admissions covered by government insurance, and long lengths of stay are all associated with lower AMDE rates. In general, AMDE rates are decreasing over time. Correlations among the coefficients are modest (Appendix E, Figure 2 ), except for the indicators of large and medium hospitals (r50.74) and those for private ownership and teaching status (r50.53).
The hierarchical model produces posterior prediction intervals for the test year AMDE rate in each hospital, shown in Figure 2 . These are on the transformed rate scale of the linear model, and the legend gives the counts of observations that are inside, above, or below the posterior prediction intervals. We use 1-sided 95% intervals to reflect the focus on facilities with worse-than-expected safety. Hospital A has observed the AMDE rate furthest below its prediction interval, 1.6 per 100 pediatric admissions, compared to the lower bound of 2.6. This is a medium, public, urban, teaching hospital with 20,279 admissions in 2011, of which 97% were pediatric. The low AMDE rate in the test year is a departure from the AMDE rates in the training years, 2.7, 2.8, and 3.1 per 100 pediatric admissions in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively. Hospital B has an AMDE rate furthest above its prediction interval, 0.9 per 100 pediatric admissions, compared to the upper bound of 0.6. Hospital B is a small, private, urban, nonteaching hospital, at which children comprised 5% of the 4622 admissions in 2011. Its high AMDE rate in the test year is a departure from its low AMDE rates in the training years, 0, 0.2, and 0 per 100 pediatric admissions in 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively. Table 2 shows the percentage of test year observations having each action chosen using both the Bayes minimum risk (rows) and the Z score (columns). The marginal proportions of actions are the same for both rules: 65% no action, 22% investigate, 8% audit, 4% remediate, and 1% shutdown. Among the 251 test year observations, the 2 decision rules produced different actions for 114 (45%) hospitals. The most concordant decision (i.e., along the diagonal of the table) between the 2 rules was no action, while the most common discrepancies were for hospitals where the Z score rule indicated no action while the Bayes minimum-risk decision was investigate (13.9%) or vice versa (15.5%). Figure 3 shows the distribution of the risks for actions chosen using these 2 decision rules. The risk differences for the commonly discrepant decisions (investigate v. no action) are usually quite small. For example, the average risk difference among hospitals where the Bayes action was investigate and the Z score indicated no action was only $489. (Recall that the risk may be interpreted as expected loss in dollars.) Compare this to the largest average risk difference, $19,166, when the Bayes decision is remediate but the Z score indicates shutdown (which occurred in only 0.4% of hospitals).
Hospital C has a Z score action with the largest posterior risk. This is a large, private, urban, nonteaching hospital with 16% pediatric admissions among its 15,553 admissions in 2011. The observed rate of 0.4 AMDEs per 100 pediatric admissions is above the prediction interval (0 to 0.3 per 100 pediatric admissions), and the Z score of 3. Note: Denominators are pediatric admissions except the percent of pediatric admissions, which uses total admissions. ADME = adverse medical device event.
Bayes minimum-risk decision for this hospital is remediate because of the loss function's penalty for diverting patients and the reference to the community AMDE rate, which was similar to the observed rate at hospital C. Hospital D is the only hospital for which both rules chose shutdown. This is a small, public, urban, teaching hospital with previous AMDE rates of 5.6, 3.8, and 4 in 2002, 2004, and 2006 , respectively. The test year rate of 4.7 is a departure from this trend and well outside the prediction interval of (0.8, 4.2). In 2011, the hospital had only 1080 total admissions and compared very unfavorably to the community AMDE rate of 1.6, making shutdown a good decision from both the Z score and minimum-risk perspectives. Figure 4 displays the distribution (across 500 simulation iterations) of the average excess risk of each decision rule. The excess risk is 0 by definition for the gold-standard case (minimum risk, true signal, true loss), so we do not display that in the figure. In general, the distribution of average excess risk for the Z score actions is larger and more spread out compared to the excess risk of the minimum-risk actions, with some Z actions having much larger excess risk. All of the largest Z score excess risks are cases in which the Z score indicates shutdown and the minimum-risk action is less serious. We can also see the impact of model and loss function misspecification on both types of decision rules, which is particularly acute when both are misspecified (top right).
Simulation Study
DISCUSSION
We develop an approach to combine hierarchical modeling for safety targets with realistic loss functions that quantify the costs and benefits of taking action on safety signals. In our analysis of AMDE rates in pediatric admissions, we find substantial differences in the actions chosen for hospitals on the basis of a loss function that integrates costs and benefits and actions chosen solely on the strength of the statistical evidence for a safety problem. In our simulation study, we find much smaller excess risk of minimum-risk actions compared to actions chosen on the basis of Z scores, even when the loss function or the model is misspecified. This supports the use of minimum-risk decisions, even when misspecification of the models for safety targets or the loss functions is a concern. In our comparison of these 2 decision rules, we have made 2 key implementation choices driven mainly by limitations of the Z score method. First, the Z score method can only produce more serious actions in response to stronger safety signals. This implies that the marginal proportion of actions should decrease with intensity, assuming that serious safety problems are rare. Thus, we set the parameters of the loss functions to produce decisions with this same feature (i.e., there is a decreasing relationship between the seriousness of the action and the marginal probability of that action).
Second, the Z score method requires us to fix thresholds for each action, meaning the marginal distribution of actions is determined in advance. For example, in a binary decision setting, placing the threshold for action v. no action at the 95th percentile of the standard normal implies that we will act 5% of the time under a Z score rule. The minimum-risk method does not require any ex ante decisions about the probability of each action. Thus, having obtained the marginal distribution of actions by applying the minimum-risk method, we set the Z score thresholds to produce this same distribution of actions. This focuses the comparison between the 2 rules on the allocation of the ''right'' hospitals to each action, rather than on the overall distribution of actions. Mean excess risk Density Figure 4 Excess risk relative to risk of minimum-risk action chosen using the true safety target and true loss function (i.e., gold standard).
The performance of the 2 rules could be decoupled by setting the Z score thresholds based on other criteria. However, modifying the basic Z score rule is beyond the scope of this article. Our minimum-risk method has a sound theoretical underpinning and allows decision makers to assign value to factors of the decision on a common and meaningful scale, such as dollars. By contrast, adjusting Z score thresholds to allow different thresholds for hospitals with different characteristics would lack this theoretical grounding and, we believe, be even more difficult than eliciting loss functions.
This study has several limitations, related both to our applied data example and our proposed method. The first and most challenging obstacle is specifying the inputs to and functional form of the loss functions. In the early phases of this project, we met with patient safety advocates and hospital administrators to understand the criteria used in making decisions about safety data. They described informal processes, implemented by networks of decision makers using diverse (and often insufficient) data with largely ad hoc criteria. Such ''messy'' processes are difficult to formalize and quantify in loss functions. Indeed, the decision makers we consulted were more concerned with the enormous burden and perceived illegitimacy of external quality and safety measurement requirements (in the case of the hospital safety officer) or the poor quality of reported data from hospitals and lack of resources for taking action (in the case of the safety advocates). Clearly, the state hospital regulatory environment is a fraught scenario in which to formalize safety decisions. Where possible, we incorporated these decision maker inputs, but further work is needed to incorporate regulator input into realistic loss functions.
However, we can imagine more tractable scenarios in which the data are clearer, stakeholder interests are aligned, and decision makers are empowered. For example, a medical device manufacturer tracks orders for, deployments of, and problems with its products. Corporate decision makers may take a range of actions in response to safety problems, including intensified postmarket data collection, forensic engineering studies of returned faulty products, ''Dear Doctor'' letters, or voluntary recall. A manufacturer could better quantify the costs and benefits of lost revenue, internal resources use, and patient harm. Moreover, with internal decision makers acting on internal evidence, the incentives for formalized processes are better aligned.
In this study, we use nationally representative administrative data on pediatric inpatient care.
Although a valuable source of broadly representative information about care delivery in the real world, it lacks clinical detail and more detailed device information. This limits our ability to identify particular devices or patient characteristics associated with more intensive care or vulnerability to safety issues. Furthermore, only device problems that generate a billable event in the course of an admission are accurately coded in our data. In addition, our data do not allow us to identify children's specialty hospitals, although we can accommodate these higher rates through the hospital-level random effects.
In addition, we limit to hospitals with sufficient pediatric admissions and enough years of observations to make longitudinal analysis tractable (i.e., at least 3 years of at least 100 observations each). This is because the AMDE proportions are so low in most hospitals that yearly admission counts lower than 100 would render any method unreliable. For instance, in our sample, the median number of AMDE admissions is 14 out of every 10,000, or 0.0014. With 100 admissions, this translates to less than 1 (0.14) ADME in each year. This limits the applicability of these methods for very rare outcomes, particularly if only a fraction of the hospital population is at risk (e.g., only pediatric patients, as in this study).
We also limit to covariates that are available in our data for all states, which excludes variables that were omitted from the database according to state-specific reporting limitations. The set of available covariates resembles those used in previous studies of medical device adverse events. One previous study of pediatric AMDE in emergency department visits 31 included ''medical specialty, device category, and device classification, as well as patient demographic characteristics, injury diagnosis, and patient disposition.'' That study focused on incidence-level reports and national estimates of counts, rather than hospital-level rates. A second previous study of pediatric specialty hospitals included age, sex, race, length of stay, disposition, chronic conditions, presence of common diagnoses, and number of admissions by patient. 17 In addition to the observable characteristics of hospitals, our model accounts for unobservable (stable) differences in hospitals through the hospital-level random effects.
In summary, our proposed combination of a formal decision-theoretic framework with hierarchical modeling for safety targets is a promising technique to formalize and improve decision making in postmarket safety surveillance. This article is an initial step in the development of robust decision rules that are statistically grounded and properly reflect the values of decision makers. In ongoing work, we are exploring the specification and robustness of loss functions and extending these ideas to other decision settings.
